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Recent protest movements such as the Indignados and Occupy advocate what they call ‘real 
democracy’. They radically reject representative democracy as implemented within existing 
institutions, and the distinction between rulers and ruled which results from it. The 
movements themselves appear to be leaderless and without clear structure. Unsurprisingly, 
anarchist, autonomist or post-operaist interpretations of these movements have been 
paramount.1 Indeed, it is tempting to interpret these ‘leaderless’ movements in terms of 
multitudes spontaneously organising themselves, or to understand Occupy and the 
Indignados’ fierce rejection to engage with institutionalised politics as a form of ‘exodus’.  
 
In her recent work, Chantal Mouffe formulates a strong critique of prevailing post-operaist 
interpretations of the recent protest movements. In the last instance, her opposition to post-
operaism is grounded in a post-foundational ontology which radically differs from the 
immanentist ontology underpinning post-operaism. According to Mouffe, the latter does not 
acknowledge the dimension of radical negativity which manifests itself in the ever-present 
possibility of antagonism.2 As a result, the post-operaist understanding of ‘real’ democracy, 
the multitude and exodus become highly problematic, as it tends to underestimate the 
exclusions involved in the very constitution of collective agencies. 
 
Surprisingly, however, Mouffe does not engage in a post-foundationalist (re-)interpretation of 
movements like Occupy and the Indignados. She limits herself to rejecting the post-operaist 
description and then goes on to criticise these movements from a mainly strategic perspective. 
According to Mouffe, the Occupy and similar movements are strategically ineffective since 
they are not able to develop a counter-hegemonic political project that truly challenges the 
existing order. What is needed, she claims, is a genuine political force which does not limit 
itself to extra-parliamentary struggle, but combines both extra-parliamentary and 
parliamentary struggle. In this context she refers to Syriza in Greece and the Front de Gauche 
in France as examples. 
 
Although we generally sympathise and agree with Mouffe’s critical remarks, in this paper we 
want to follow a slightly different route. Instead of focusing on a strategic and ontological 
critique, we think it might be useful to use Mouffe and Laclau’s post-foundational theory of 
hegemony as a descriptive tool in order to re-interpret the recent protest movements. Rather 
than juxtaposing new and more traditional protest movements on the basis of strategic 
concerns or the ontology of their predominant theorisations, we must try to understand why 
the present constellation tends to generate the new type of movements that we recently 
witnessed. As we will argue, the current constellation, for a number of reasons, makes the 
construction of a ‘we’, a collective identity that can stimulate the passions of the many, 
particularly challenging. Therefore, it is no coincidence that recent protest movements have 
paid special attention to symbols and to how these may contribute to carve out new spaces for 
the emergence of political identities. This symbolic and even theatrical dimensions of recent 
protest movements deserve our utmost attention, not only since they are politically salient, but 
because they embody basic tenets of Mouffe’s own agonistic or discourse-theoretical 
approach, in which the construction of a ‘we’ and the role of representations take centre stage. 
 
 
 
Constructing a ‘We’ 
 
 
In the conclusion of her latest book, Agonistics, Mouffe claims she wants to ‘examine the 
responses of radical political theorists to these movements [i.e. the recent mobilizations in 
liberal democratic societies] and the different ways in which these movements have been 
interpreted’.3 Yet, according to us, besides the interpretations examined and criticized by 
Mouffe, there is one important interpretation missing, namely a re-interpretation of the recent 
protest movements from the point of view of Mouffe’s and Laclau’s theory of hegemony. The 
fact that the movements’ activists often interpret their own activity in post-operaist rather than 
in counter-hegemonic or agonistic terms, does not preclude such a re-interpretation. In actual 
fact, looking at the recent movements from this alternative perspective may lead to a better 
understanding of their possible shortcomings. 
 
Let us briefly recall the core elements of Mouffe’s post-foundational theory of hegemony. 
Mouffe understands the concept of hegemony first and foremost as an articulatory practice 
whereby floating signifiers are fixed within a network of signifying chains. These signifying 
chains are always constructed vis-à-vis an excluded element that serves as a constitutive 
outside.4 Essentially, hegemony points to a constitutive logic: it is an attempt to suture a 
dislocated space and to create a new space of representation in which a variety of demands 
can be inscribed.5 However, hegemonisation is always characterized by contingency. Any 
articulatory practice requires the repression of alternative possibilities and the reason for 
excluding one alternative over the other is based on a decision which has only itself as a  
(non-) ground. The terrain of structural undecidability thus functions as condition of 
possibility and final impossibility of any attempt to hegemonise the field of discursivity.6  
 
Important from our perspective is the fact that hegemony is essentially an attempt to re-
articulate dislocated elements into ‘new spaces of representation that attempt to suture  
the dislocated space in question’.7 In this regard, the Occupy movement and its continental 
twin sister, the Indignados, can be considered as responses to growing dislocations caused by 
the financial crisis and the ensuing debt crisis. People lost their jobs, unemployment rose, 
politics seemed powerless and growing discontent found no ways to express itself. However, 
the Occupy movement, through the practice of occupying city squares, created a space of 
representation for a wide variety of demands that had no strict logical connection to one 
another. In this sense, the assemblies cannot be considered merely decision-making tools. The 
assemblies enabled the movement to represent itself to itself and to understand itself as one.8 
Demands for reforms of the tax system, carbon reduction, revolutionary action and a fair 
redistribution of wealth became all represented in the same symbolic space. Occupy made 
these demands visible and representable by re-articulating them in a chain of equivalence 
structured around nodal points like ‘real democracy’, ‘Occupy’ and ‘the 99%’. These nodal 
points functioned as empty signifiers under which the chain of equivalence was remarkably 
broadened. In the discourse of the Spanish Indignados, for example, this chain stretched from 
‘progressives’ to ‘conservatives’. The opening lines of their Manifesto read as follows: 
 
We are ordinary people. We are like you: people, who get up every morning to 
study, work or find a job, people who have family and friends. People, who 
work hard every day to provide a better future for those around us. Some of us 
consider ourselves progressive, others conservative. Some of us believers, some 
not. Some of us have clearly defined ideologies, others are apolitical, but we are 
all concerned and angry about the political, economic, and social outlook which 
we see around us: corruption among politicians, businessmen, bankers, leaving 
us helpless, without a voice. This situation has become normal, a daily suffering, 
without hope. But if we join forces, we can change it. It’s time to change things, 
time to build a better society together.9  
 
It is tempting to read the opening lines of this manifesto as the ultimate example of a post-
political logic. At first glance, political and ideological cleavages are denied. The only 
possible identification is one with a nameless and unproblematic ‘we, the people’. This 
seemingly post-ideological ‘we, the people’ is simply called upon to ‘join forces’ in order ‘to 
build a better society together’. Strikingly, these lines could perfectly have been the opening 
paragraph of a neoliberal, socialist, fascist or anarchist manifesto.  
 
However, these opening lines may also be read in an alternative way. Indeed, the seemingly 
post-political call for mobilisation can also be interpreted as an attempt to create a chain of 
equivalence that is as wide as possible. This might also be the reason why both the Occupy 
and the Indignados refused to identify themselves with a formal program containing concrete 
demands. As Laclau has argued, the vaguer the political demands, the more differing demands 
it can incorporate, and the more people who may identify with the nascent counter-hegemonic 
discourse. Hence vagueness is constitutive for social unity.10 The consequence is that the 
differences between the links in the equivalential chain tend to be neutralized: conservative 
and progressive, believers and non-believers are considered to be part of the same ‘people’.11 
 
However, no chain of equivalence can be established without a constitutive outside. Mouffe 
has emphasized throughout her work that political identities are always relational: a ‘we’ 
cannot emerge without a ‘them’.12 The Indignados, in the opening lines of their manifesto, 
also try to establish a ‘we’ in opposition to a ‘they’. The adversaries are ‘bankers, politicians 
and businessmen’ that leave us ‘helpless and without a voice’. Within the Occupy movement, 
a similar attempt to create an adversary can be noticed. By choosing ‘we are the 99%’ as a 
central slogan, the movement considered the wealthy ‘1%’ as their adversary. Yet, in both 
cases, the adversary remains vague, resulting in a kindred vague development of the 
antagonism itself. For this reason, the Occupy movement and the Indignados have been 
fiercely criticised by Mouffe.13  
 
In brief, the Indignados and Occupy tended to construct a very broad chain of equivalence 
vis-à-vis a very vaguely identified enemy. The effect was that the unity of the movements had 
to be precarious as it was very inclusive. As a result, neither Occupy nor the Indignados have 
been able to transform themselves into lasting counter-hegemonic forces that express a 
collective will in the form of an alternative political project. Instead, they became volatile 
movements that only established, at the end of the day, a very weak chain of equivalence. 
However, this does not mean that these new movements were unaware that some form of 
social unity had to be constructed. Both the Occupy movement and the Spanish Indignados 
attempted to construct a ‘we’, yet not in a traditional way. They dismissed traditional leftist 
discourses on alliances, representation, leadership and strategy, but they did not refrain from 
building a chain of equivalence as such.14 They experimented, or so we claim, with new ways 
to construct a collective identity. Doubtlessly, the assemblies, manifestos, slogans and shared 
aesthetics that characterized the movements should be considered as deliberate attempts to 
create such a discursive unity. These experiments, for that matter, can perfectly be understood 
and explained in terms of the logic of equivalence, hegemony and antagonism. For the latter 
inevitably determine the field of discursivity in which any movement operates.  
 
 
 
Institutional and Symbolic Effectiveness 
 
 
In her critical analysis of the recent protest movements, Mouffe draws a distinction between 
popular mobilisations ‘that follow more traditional left patterns’ and ‘those that diverge from 
them’.15 While the latter type includes the Spanish Indignados and Occupy, Mouffe refers to 
the Chilean student movement as an example of the former, and she clearly prefers the 
approach of this latter movement. In contrast to Occupy or the Indignados, the Chilean 
movement was formally organised, was based on a visible alliance of social and political 
forces and was therefore grounded in a conscious articulation of a chain of equivalence. It had 
elected leaders, did not reject party affiliation and had clear demands that it addressed to the 
state. Its strategy fits within a long tradition of strategic thinking on the left that owes a lot to 
the work of Gramsci and especially Poulantzas. To a certain extent, Mouffe’s work is a 
theoretically highly innovative reformulation of this tradition.  
 
An implicit assumption of this strategic framework is that power is located in the state or 
state-like institutions, against which one should build a counter-hegemony. This happens 
through the interplay of extra-parliamentary struggles by social movements and mobilisations 
in civil society on the one hand, and struggles by representative agencies such as political 
parties within state institutions on the other. The state, in this perspective, is not seen as a 
unitary subject but as a relation: it is constituted by a set of apparatuses that are criss-crossed 
by oppositions and conflicts.16 This concentric model, typical for domestic politics, also 
seems to be presupposed in most of Mouffe’s works concerning the radicalisation of 
democracy. The examples of contemporary radical politics Mouffe refers to in Agonistics, 
namely Syriza in Greece and the Front de Gauche in France, also fit within such a domestic 
framework. In contrast to these examples, she argues, Occupy and the Indignados are bound 
to remain ineffective if they refuse to work toward and within institutions, via representative 
agencies such as parties or trade unions. Mouffe is right to point out that the concrete 
institutional effects of Occupy and similar movements are very limited. The question, 
however, is: what is effectiveness? We are confronted with a strange paradox. Compared to 
the Chilean movement, Occupy and the Indignados were indeed institutionally rather 
ineffective. Yet, again in contrast to the Chilean case, their symbolic effectiveness was huge. 
All over the world, people identified with the new protest movements, and started to camp in 
squares and public places. Occupy thus sparked a global wave of actions and initiatives and 
was capable of symbolically constructing a point of identification for a global audience. The 
movement was able to stir the passions of a large number of people all over the world, and 
made it possible for them to imagine they were part of the same global movement.  
 This observation reminds us of Laclau and Mouffe’s highly original reading of Rosa 
Luxemburg’s text The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions in Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy. What interests Rosa Luxemburg is how a specific struggle can become 
the spark which ignites the desires and passions of groups in other places, and may stimulate 
them to also start a struggle. In their interpretation of Luxemburg, Laclau and Mouffe 
illuminate the symbolic dimension of struggle: a struggle can become a symbol and a point of 
identification in itself. They point out that the meaning of every mobilisation is split: ‘aside 
from its specific literal demands, each mobilization represents the revolutionary process as a 
whole’.17 ‘[I]n a revolutionary situation’, they write, ‘it is impossible to fix the literal sense of 
each isolated struggle, because each struggle overflows its own literality and comes to 
represent, in the consciousness of the masses, a simple moment of a more global struggle 
against the system.’ 18   
Laclau and Mouffe thus analyse struggle as a symbol that is inevitably characterised by ‘the 
overflowing of the signifier by the signified’.19 As this ‘overflowing’, and the resulting 
‘emptiness’ of the signifier is tendential, however, we can differentiate between different 
types of struggles as symbols, according to the degree to which such a process of ‘emptying’ 
has had its way. Occupy, for example, came to stand for much more than a concrete set of 
demands formulated by a group of activists in Zuccotti park, but became a symbol in itself: it 
represented the very possibility to contest the current state of affairs, to ask radical questions 
and to call for changing the world.20 Moreover, Occupy activists seem to have been very 
aware of the symbolic importance of what they were doing. It is from that perspective that a 
number of their practices should be understood. Their actions can hardly be considered as part 
of a strategy; they were primarily of a theatrical nature. 
 
Indeed, in our view, protest movements such as the Indignados or Occupy can be understood 
as theatrical performances that contributed to a growing de-identification with the present 
order. The acts through which such processes of de-identification took place – assemblies, 
occupations, sit-ins – had a lot of similarities with artistic interventions in public space. It is at 
this point that a link can be made with Mouffe’s interpretation of Alfredo Jaar’s artistic 
counter-hegemonic practices. She claims that 
 
[…] Jaar aims at moving people to act by creating in them a desire for change. 
Discarding the authoritative mode of address, he prefers to interpellate people by 
setting in motion a process that will make them question their unexamined 
beliefs. He is convinced that the best way to move people to act is by awakening 
consciousness of what is missing in their lives and by bringing them to feel that 
things could be different.21 
 
Should the occupation of squares and the organisation of public assemblies not be interpreted 
along similar lines? Participants in the recent protest movements did not aim to tell people 
what to do or how to act, rather they wanted to create a consciousness and to show how things 
could be different. In this sense, the assemblies were, apart from being a form of self-
representation also a performance that showed people that a different type of society might be 
possible. It follows that Occupy and the Indignados have maybe much more in common with 
types of artistic activism such as Reclaim the Streets or the Yes Men than with traditional 
political movements; since what they aimed for was symbolic effectiveness through aesthetic 
and affective means. Think in that regard of the Guy Fawkes masks, the emphasis on slogans 
and the evocative and affective nature of the opening lines of the manifesto of the Spanish 
Indignados. In the case of Occupy and the Indignados, this symbolic dimension was also 
translated into a taking of a distance, theorised as ‘exodus’. In our view, more than a strategy, 
exodus must be understood as a part of a performance. The idea of an outside to the existing 
order was performed, rather than actually pursued. Of course, we do not suggest that 
protesters should be regarded as artists but rather that the nature of their actions can better be 
understood from the perspective of artistic practices instead of politico-strategic practices. 
This insight is rooted in the observation that creative performances or innovative symbols are 
more and more often mobilised by global movements in order to disrupt post-political 
representations of the present. 
 
From that perspective, it might also be elucidating to refer to Jacques Rancière’s conception 
of political action to make sense of Occupy and the Indignados. Political action, for Rancière, 
is theatrical par excellence: it entails the de-identification with the roles and identities of the 
existing ‘police order’ and the production of a new political subject by acting on the 
assumption of equality, thus making visible something that remained previously invisible. 
Political action disturbs or subverts the existing ‘order of the sensible’, the order of what is 
sayable, hearable or visible, and makes it possible for a new political subject to appear, which 
is both a part and the whole at the same time. It is a part as it is a concrete group of people, 
while it is a whole to the extent that it renders visible what underlies all social relations, 
namely equality.22  
 
The core feature of a political act, for Rancière, is disidentification and acting as if one is 
equal.23 This is precisely what Occupy and similar movements did. The movements enacted a 
distancing from and a de-identification with the powers that be. Moreover, its dismissal of 
representation (or better still: of the institutional division between professional politicians and 
citizens) was first and foremost an affirmation of equality, giving everyone the right to speak 
and participate. These movements did not understand themselves as movements originating 
from a specific social group or class fighting for its rights or interests, but aimed to render 
visible the capacity of each and everyone to establish ‘real’ democracy and act in a way that 
differs from how a presumably corrupt political and economic order functions (as in ‘Occupy 
everything’). In this sense, it made the ‘demos’ visible, which Rancière understands as the 
very subject of equality.24  
 
At the same time, however, the limits of Rancière’s political philosophy are also the limits of 
movements like the Indignados or other types of artistic activism. For Rancière, the political 
act is limited to the event through which something new becomes visible.25 In a similar vein, 
artistic activism might trigger something new in the sense of new needs, identifications or 
insights, but these are not enough to create a new counter-hegemonic order. Mouffe claims: 
 
Contrary to what some artivists seem to believe, however, this does not mean 
that artivist practices can alone realize the transformations needed for the 
establishment of a new hegemony. […] It is an illusion to believe that artistic 
activism could, on its own, bring about the end of neo-liberal hegemony.26 
 
Mouffe’s questioning of the strategic effectiveness remains valid. Artistic practices or the 
reduction of the political to a theatrical gesture are indeed insufficient to create counter-
hegemony. Although Mouffe tends to underestimate the symbolic effectiveness and artistic 
dimension of the new movements, she rightly emphasizes the lack of concrete institutional 
effectiveness. However, in order to acquire a better understanding of the new movements, we 
cannot avoid the question of why these movements adopted this particular form of protesting. 
Is a mere lack of strategic and political perspicacity a sufficient explanation, or is something 
more at stake?  
 
 
 
Occupy as a Symptom 
 
 
Mouffe’s critical questions about the strategic ineffectiveness of Occupy and like-minded 
movements are on the mark. Yet, perhaps the picture is more complex than the choice 
between a post-foundational political ontology and a counter-hegemonic strategy outside and 
within existing institutions on the one hand, and an operaist ontology combined with an 
‘exodus’ strategy on the other. In this section, we shed a different light on the background of 
the new protest movements, in order to acquire a better understanding of the importance of 
their symbolic and theatrical dimension. This focus does not disprove the agonistic approach, 
but attempts to contribute to a better understanding of the complex predicament in which new 
social movements find themselves today. Indeed, what if the difficulty of defining an 
adversary is not merely the result of a poor political ontology or a lack of strategic insight, but 
the symptom of a political constellation that has become increasingly complex? What if the 
very conditions for traditional leftist counter-hegemonic strategic thinking have disappeared, 
or, at least, are perceived as basically lacking? Should we not consider Occupy and similar 
protest movements as symptoms of a constellation that has dramatically changed over the past 
decades: a constellation in which the delineation of a clear divide between hegemonic 
‘antagonists’ has become less evident? This predicament may of course be the result of 
neoliberalism’s hegemony and its concomitant post-political representations of society, but 
there is also the intrinsic complexity of the issues which present-day social movements are 
dealing with and which makes it all the more difficult to establish a clear-cut and apparent 
we/them divide.  
 
Mouffe claims that ‘an adversary cannot be defined in broad general terms like “Empire”, or 
for that matter “Capitalism”, but in terms of nodal points of power that need to be targeted 
and transformed in order to create the conditions for a new hegemony’.27 Likewise, the enemy 
confronted by recent protest movements cannot be defined in terms of ‘the 1%’ or ‘the 
system’. That is correct, but at the same time it begs the question for contemporary radical 
politics as to how exactly one has to identify the ‘nodal points of power’ that need to be 
targeted, and how to construct alternative nodal points? The anonymity (and mobility) of the 
opponent makes it extremely difficult to locate the latter. Even if one rejects the idea of 
Empire, it is difficult to deny that it has become increasingly problematic to clearly locate the 
actual power agencies, let alone to identify a proper adversary. Who is ‘Wall Street’, for 
example? Should we target the banks, the bankers, politicians, a street, the entire financial 
system?  
 
As a result, it seems to have become difficult to delineate what protest movements oppose as 
such. If everything is financialised (including one’s education via student loans, nature 
through natural capital accounting, social security via pension funds, democracy via public 
debt etcetera), exactly defining what has to change becomes hard. There is a similar problem 
with the climate movement. Large parts of this movement also stress the importance of 
exodus, prefiguration and the construction of the common here and now, which makes them 
similar to the Occupy movement. Even though it is perfectly possible to point at a handful of 
big polluters that cause the major part of CO2 emissions, almost everything we do emits CO2 
and can in principle become the target of environmental action. We can fight climate change 
by using fewer fossil fuels, by killing wild camels (which is actually done in Australia), or by 
changing our dietary habits. As all things have an environmental impact, the object of 
environmental concern can, in principle, be everything.28  
 
Of course, there is no pre-given or essential target of political action: the latter is always a 
hegemonic construction. However, the issues that were targeted by previous protest 
movements belonged to a social space that was structured in a way that made it easier to 
determine the object of political action, or, to formulate demands. If confronted with the 
exploitation of labour, the oppression of women, or racism, it is much easier to identify the 
main actors, sites and mechanisms responsible for it. These struggles were related to subject 
positions, which were doubtlessly hegemonically constructed, but they already exhibited a 
definite structural inscription within the prevailing hegemony.  
 
Furthermore, many Occupy or climate activists stress that we are also included in what we 
oppose. We create environmental impact by the way we live. We depend on money and banks 
in our daily lives and we expect interest on our bank deposits. People are always already 
included in hegemonic configurations, even if they protest against them.29 Yet, being part of 
the capitalist system due to the fact that one earns a wage constitutes a different form of 
‘inclusion’ than participating in the money and financial systems or in a polluting production 
and consumption system. In the case of the wage relation, there is a clear ‘other’ that can be 
constructed into an adversary, namely the employer. In the case of our involvement in more 
anonymous systems such as finance and pollution, this is different. At least, this is how many 
activists appear to experience their predicament. From this perspective, it is no coincidence 
that experimenting with alternative practices here and now (including so-called ‘prefigurative 
practices’) has become such an important dimension of many recent protest movements. This 
complexity does not mean that it has become entirely impossible to point to nodes of power 
that one can oppose. Yet, it becomes increasingly difficult to establish a clear divide, and to 
make a strong and convincing case for delineating a ‘we’ and a ‘them’.30  
 
In other words, the very issues which spark opposition today and the post-political context 
within which this opposition is to be enacted, makes it intrinsically difficult to politicise 
things. The ‘artivism’ and reflections of many contemporary activists should be understood 
against this backdrop. If financialisation is reaching into the very details of our lives and if 
everything we do has an environmental impact, ‘everything’ should be changed, including 
ourselves. ‘Occupy everything’ is a significant slogan in this regard: it testifies to the idea that 
it has become less easy to exactly identify or locate the nodes of power. The slogan reveals 
the difficulty of pointing at concrete nodes which should strategically be prioritized. 
Significantly, the Occupy and the Indignados have a very limited notion of the enemy (the 
‘1%’, the bankers, politicians), and at the same time a very broad one (including all political 
parties, representative institutions and agencies, which have been ‘sold’ to the financial 
system).  
 
Gramsci argues that one does not choose the terrain of struggle oneself, but that it is to a large 
extent determined by the adversary.31 What Occupy and similar movements do, is trying to 
reverse this order, largely under pressure of the specific conditions of their struggle: not to 
chase the adversary on the latter’s place (which it is difficult to locate), but to occupy a proper 
place. If the terrain of struggle cannot be clearly located and determined, social movements 
will have to create it by themselves. It is in relation to this observation, that one should 
understand the symbolic and artistic character of radical protest movements today. The 
theatrical gestures are attempts to create a space in which the struggle becomes representable. 
It entails an unsettling of common sense and the theatrical pre-figuration of an alternative 
order. More than reading these movements as organized along the lines of already established 
we/them distinctions, they must be seen as attempts to recreate the conditions of possibility 
for such (ant)agonistic distinction. 
 
Take, for example, the notion of exodus. As Mouffe rightly stresses, ‘exodus’ is far from an 
effective strategy to realise change.32 Yet, as mentioned earlier, perhaps it should not be 
conceived as a strategy, but rather as a primordial symbolic and theatrical act that serves as a 
precondition for establishing a ‘we’. Indeed, pointing to the system as a whole as the 
opponent triggers the question who ‘we’ are and where we stand. What the slogan of ‘exodus’ 
calls for, therefore, is the very enactment of a ‘constitutive outside’ that is the necessary 
condition for clearly delineating a ‘them’. Taking into account the specificity of the 
encompassing problems contemporary protest movements are confronted with, exodus and 
other symbolic acts which provoke de-identification appear to be a precondition for 
establishing a ‘we’ and a ‘them’, and thus for creating an agonistic space.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This article is an attempt to use Mouffe’s agonistic approach to shed an alternative light on 
Occupy and similar movements, and to reformulate Mouffe’s critique of these movements. 
Part of the effort was oriented to showing that the agonistic framework provides the tools for 
a more adequate description of the movement than (post-autonomist and other) theories 
however influential they may be within these movements themselves. Indeed, nothing 
prevents us from considering the new protest movements as attempts to create a chain of 
equivalence between widely differing and isolated demands. Under these conditions, central 
signifiers such as ‘Occupy’, ‘Real Democracy Now!’ or ‘the 99%’ have become empty 
signifiers that represent and produce the fragile unity of these movements as such.  
 
The recent protest movements focused on the creation of a chain of equivalence that would be 
as wide as possible, without however clearly defining an adversary or giving the formulation 
of concrete demands the place it should have. Focusing in particular on the symbolic and 
performative constitution of a ‘we’, they were symbolically effective, but at the same time 
institutionally weak and rather volatile. In our view, this specific mode of organizing and 
staging the protests cannot be simply reduced to a strategic or ideological choice made by the 
participants or certain key figures within those movements. The type of protests we witnessed 
during bygone years should also be understood as addressing the present constellation in 
which it becomes increasingly difficult to determine who is the adversary and where s/he is 
located.  
 
More specifically, the difficulty of locating and identifying the adversary has to be understood 
against the background of two processes that are partly interrelated. First and foremost, there 
is the process of depoliticisation that has made it increasingly difficult to visibly construct 
clear we/them distinctions. Secondly, there is the specific character of the issues targeted by 
recent protest movements and the way they are structurally embedded in the contemporary 
mode of functioning of capitalism. In case of financial capitalism, for example, it is far from 
self-evident to locate the place of power or to identify the actors who make crucial decisions.  
 Mouffe’s call for a truly counter-hegemonic political project that defines its adversaries in 
political terms is justified. Yet, the conditions under which such strategy is possible are 
changing. The nation state and its institutions are no longer the privileged place where the 
current order can be challenged. The contemporary political and economic order is 
constructed in such way that a clear delineation between different hegemonic groups is far 
from evident. It is our hypothesis that movements such as Occupy or the Indignados should 
be understood as attempts to re-politicise the current constellation. From a theoretical point of 
view, their symbolic strategies deserve a thorough investigation, which should fertilise the 
hard-needed reflection on how to develop new and effective strategies for building agonistic 
political spaces. Many activists in the recent movements intuitively felt that the complexity of 
the new global order calls for a different type of radical politics. This is at least one of the 
reasons why a large part of the protestors were hostile towards parliamentary democracy and 
existing political parties. In contrast to post-operaist interpretations, this should not be 
understood in terms of an exodus strategy but rather as a symbolic attempt to repoliticise the 
given constellation. It is related to a theatrical performance through which a distance is 
enacted from the (increasingly anonymous) powers behind recent crises. More than a 
deliberate strategy, this de-identification should be understood as a symbolic act. In this 
regard, the assemblies organized by the Indignados and Occupy were more than decision 
making procedures: they were symbolic performances in which participants treated each other 
as if everybody was equal. Enacting (the very possibility of) an alternative order is a political 
act par excellence through which the adversary is not defined but rather provoked to identify 
himself as the adversary. In our view this is the fundamental significance of movements like 
Occupy and the Indignados: within a complex and depoliticised order they attempt to create 
the conditions wherein new types of agonistic struggle may occur.  
 
To conclude, we can state that Occupy and comparable movements symbolically manifested 
themselves ‘outside’ the hegemonic order – which, of course, is eventually impossible. Yet, 
they thus established the symbolic preconditions for an intense and broad process of 
identification for people all over the world. In this sense, movements like Occupy (such as the 
mostly theatrical and symbolic nature of the alterglobalisation or radical climate movement) 
constitute a first step in a process of (re)politicisation. Occupy, in this sense, contributed to 
making society ‘readable’ or interpretable again in terms of we/them distinctions. However, 
as Mouffe has stressed, the unsolved riddle remains how to translate this symbolic 
effectiveness into institutional effectiveness.  
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